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exeCutIVe summary
In December 2011, researchers from Columbia University’s National Center for Disaster Preparedness (NCDP) 
interviewed key officials and community leaders in Joplin, Missouri in order to document the major themes 
of the recovery effort approximately six months after the May 22 tornado.  That disaster killed 161 people and 
injured 1,500 others. It destroyed or severely damaged a major hospital and much of the health infrastructure, 
ten public school buildings, about 7,500 homes, 523 small businesses and several major big box stores.  It dis-
placed one third of the population of 50,000.
Various factors offered a favorable foundation for recovery.  This disaster did not entail massive disruptions 
to basic utilities or massive ongoing threats to public safety or public health.  As the tornado largely missed 
the retail hub, it mainly spared the city government’s fiscal base (but it had a much more significant impact on 
the real estate tax-dependent school system).  The scale of physical destruction and loss of life “felt” large to 
residents, resulted in a widespread identification with the suffering of those who had experienced losses, and 
elicited a large and enduring national outpouring of assistance and support from all sectors of society.  
Post-tornado Joplin exhibited barely any polarization or political conflict over the direction and control of 
recovery.  Many informants noted that both the Midwestern and Christian character of the community had made 
residents come to each other’s assistance on a massive and sustained basis.  The business and faith-based com-
munities were well-established partners with each other and with local government.  Prior collaborative efforts 
related to downtown redevelopment, increasing high school graduation rates, promoting regional economic 
development, and recovering from periodic major ice storms and lesser tornados, had accustomed diverse 
stakeholders to working with each other.  A highly involved and visible governor, who spearheaded state-led 
disaster relief funding, was another noteworthy factor.  Finally, our informants had immense confidence that both 
the economic strength and social values of their community had survived the tornado intact. 
Within a few weeks to a few months of the storm, four critical actions and accomplishments oriented Joplin 
towards a positive recovery trajectory.  First, city government coordinated the US Army Corps of Engineers’ 
removal of three million cubic yards of debris (more than the total resulting from the destruction of the World 
Trade Center) in a mere 68 days.  Second, the school system assembled replacement facilities that allowed the 
public schools to reopen on schedule only 85 days after the disaster.  Third, the sponsor of the destroyed hospital 
committed to build a new, comparable size facility in Joplin and retain its workforce in the area until the new 
hospital was built.  The city’s other major hospital both ramped up its service level dramatically and accelerated 
a significant physical expansion.  Fourth, a group of civic leaders and interested citizens organized the Citizens 
Advisory Recovery Team (“CART”) within two weeks of the tornado, as a platform for long-term recovery plan-
ning.  Consisting of volunteers from a broad cross section of the community, CART received technical, logistical 
and operational support from FEMA.  At the end of a four-month community engagement and brainstorming 
process, CART delivered to the City Council a series of recommendations leaning heavily towards elements of 
the physical environment that would be susceptible to change and improvement as part of the reconstruction 
process.  These included the location and nature of commercial and mixed use districts; residential building, 
design and energy efficiency standards; sidewalks and bike paths; new schools and school tornado shelters; a 
trail system; and a memorial.  Shortly thereafter, the Mayor charged a task force consisting of representatives 
of the public school system, the business community and the city government with narrowing down the recom-
mendations and figuring out how to implement them.
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exeCutIVe summary
In addition, the same network of non-profits and churches that had mobilized to assist victims of prior disasters 
sprang into action.  Various parties assembled home sites, donated building materials and volunteered their 
labor—in aggregate nearly $1.6 million—for seven new homes whose construction was broadcast nationwide 
on the program Extreme Makeover: Home Edition.  Major benefactors such as the Jolie-Pitt and Danforth 
Foundations, Rush Limbaugh and Sheryl Crow jump-started a plethora of relief and redevelopment funds.  The 
Governor’s office rapidly announced funding for long-term community mental health needs, housing, economic 
development and fiscal relief.  Joplin also experienced an influx of two to three volunteers for every permanent 
resident of the city.  
Six months after the tornado, Joplin’s recovery had made significant strides, but appeared to be at a crossroads.  
Local leadership across all sectors faced hard decisions about how to apply millions of dollars of federal and 
state redevelopment grants and tax incentives and philanthropic donations.  They also had to deal with long-term 
community mental health issues, maintain a level of intensity and involvement among a population that already 
had endured so much, sustain the cooperative atmosphere of the first six months, and minimize contention as 
specific resource allocation decisions were made.
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preface
In December 2011, two researchers from Columbia University’s National Center for  
Disaster Preparedness (NCDP) conducted informal, loosely-structured interviews of  
60-90 minutes with local officials and community leaders in Joplin, Missouri.  
introduction
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A third colleague, an acute care pediatric specialist, 
interviewed health care providers and school system 
personnel for a companion study of the pediatric care 
system’s response to the tornado.1 Our objective was 
to document the major threads and themes of the 
recovery effort at approximately six months after the 
killer tornado of May 22, 2011—to present a snapshot 
of recovery at six months, so to speak. 
We used a combination of reputational and nomination 
sampling to identify the types of stakeholders likely to 
be motivated or required by their jobs or societal roles 
to participate actively in long term recovery activi-
ties.  We also relied upon newspaper coverage prior 
to our visit and recommendations from other Joplin 
residents.  Unless otherwise indicated, we derived all 
of the information in this report solely from the inter-
views and did not independently confirm respondent 
information.  We interviewed the people identified at 
the beginning of this report, usually one on one, but 
occasionally in groups of two or three.2  We digitally 
recorded all interviews with our subjects’ consent, and 
obtained a professional transcript of each recording.  
We subsequently reviewed the transcripts without 
employing content analysis software.
The physical backdrop of Joplin at six months beyond 
the tornado offered revealing markers of progress, 
particularly to the member of the Columbia team who 
had visited the Gulf Coast six-month after Hurricane 
Katrina.  Debris had long since been cleared away, and 
the only visible evidence that evoked the concept of 
“devastation” was the wreckage of St. John’s Regional 
Medical Center, Joplin High School and the odd, 
teetering house that had not yet been demolished.  As 
none of us ever had been to Joplin before, the block 
upon block of empty lots, or lots with slabs or founda-
tions, interspersed with randomly placed new homes 
under construction, seemed more like a virgin area 
being developed for the first time than the remainder 
of what had been a densely built up and heavily 
populated area. 
We knew upon arriving in Joplin that a number of 
crucial steps towards recovery already had been 
completed, in addition to the removal of virtually all of 
the rubble.  The public schools had reopened in mid-
August after a frantic summer scramble to assemble 
temporary facilities.  Brad Pitt, Angelina Jolie and 
former U.S. Senator John Danforth had donated $1 
million among the three of them to seed major relief 
and economic development efforts.  The long-standing 
Community Organizations Active in Disasters had 
stood up a Long Term Recovery Committee, as it had 
after recent ice storms and much smaller tornados, 
and begun the arduous tasks of case management and 
meeting basic human needs for thousands of dis-
placed households.  Both the Tulsa affiliate of Habitat 
for Humanity and Extreme Makeover: Home Edition 
had come to Joplin and erected new homes amid 
much fanfare.3  A FEMA-assisted long term recovery 
planning process recently had wrapped up and made 
an important presentation to the Joplin City Council.  
Missouri’s governor Jay Nixon had been spending a 
substantial amount of time in Joplin to offer financial 
and moral support, most recently at an emotional six 
month commemoration ceremony. Much, in short, 
already had occurred.
In our background reading we had been particularly 
struck by the seeming absence of rancor among 
the Joplin citizens and leaders whose stories had 
made their way into the national media.  We’d been 
impressed and moved by the stories of fantastic 
heroism, selflessness, and creativity among the people 
who had held the community together in the initial 
weeks after the tornado.  We’d been intrigued by the 
prideful pledges we’d seen on various Joplin recovery
websites, that Joplin was going to show the rest of 
America how to do recovery right.  And we’d made 
a note to ourselves to pay close attention to how the 
six month milestone affected the population’s level of 
energy, commitment, civility and collaboration.
It was apparent by the end of our visit that in selecting 
this particular group of informants, we had ended 
up focusing perhaps disproportionately on just one 
dimension of long term recovery, i.e., the portion 
assisted by FEMA’s Emergency Support Function 
#14.  This was the Citizens Advisory Recovery Team, 
as discussed at length in this report.  We gave rela-
tively little attention to business recovery activities 
through the Joplin Area Chamber of Commerce or 
other business-oriented organizations.  Likewise to 
the disaster case management, social and human 
services-oriented activities of the Long Term Recovery 
Committee created by the Jasper County Community 
Organizations Active in Disasters.  Finally, although 
many of the people we interviewed mentioned that the 
state government had been extraordinarily helpful in 
innumerable ways, we did not have an opportunity to 
meet with anyone from the State Division of Economic 
Development or the State Housing Task Force during 
our time in Joplin.  It is likely that this report does not 
completely represent the state government’s support 
during the first six months after the tornado. 
introduction
cont’d
at the CrOssrOaDs Of LONg-term reCOVery: jOPLIN, mIssOurI sIx mONths after the may 22, 2011 tOrNaDO 5
summary of majOr Damages/LOsses
On May 22, 2011, the City of Joplin, Missouri and some of its surrounding 
communities lived through one of the worst tornados in U.S. history.
In the prior sixty years there had been only 56 tor-
nados in the United States registering as EF-5, and 
a storm of that strength had not touched down in 
Missouri since 1957.4  The official National Weather 
Service report described the Joplin tornado as follows:
“The tornado was rated EF-5 on the Enhanced-Fujita 
Scale, with its maximum winds estimated at more 
than 200 mph.  The path of the entire tornado was 22.1 
miles long and was up to 1 mile in width.  The EF-4/EF-5 
damage path was roughly 6 miles long…and generally 
½ to ¾ of a mile wide along the path.”5   
The EF4-EF5 damage path, known as the “scar zone,” 
was entirely within the City of Joplin, and catastrophic 
damage occurred to many sectors of the city.  Various 
eyewitness accounts from Joplin report that the 
tornado touched ground for an incredible 22 minutes, 
leading to its characterization as a “grinder.”  Public 
officials and local medical institutions consistently 
report that the storm killed 161 people and injured at a 
minimum 1,000 to 1,500 others.  These deaths resulted 
in a fatality rate comparable to that from Hurricane 
Katrina.6   
Joplin, with a permanent resident population of 
approximately 50,000 is the regional economic hub 
for a multi-county region that covers parts of Missouri, 
Oklahoma, Kansas, and Arkansas.  City officials regu-
larly report that the city’s daytime population swells 
to as many as 250,000 people who come to work, 
shop, and take advantage of the city’s health, medical 
and educational services and cultural amenities.  
The tornado totally destroyed one of the two major 
hospitals in Joplin, 367-bed Mercy St. John’s Regional 
Medical Center.  It leveled or severely damaged large 
portions of the community’s health infrastructure, 
including medical offices, six nursing homes, two 
dialysis centers, eight mental health facilities serving 
varied populations, four home health care agencies, a 
hospice agency and a detox center.7  It produced more 
than three million cubic yards of rubble.8 
During its rampage through Joplin, the storm 
destroyed six of the public school system’s school 
and administration buildings and badly damaged 
four others.9  It totally destroyed approximately 4,000 
homes and severely damaged approximately 3,500 
others, accounting collectively for 34-38% of the city’s 
total housing stock.10  In so doing, it displaced close 
to one third of the city’s entire population (estimates 
range from 14,000 to 17,000 people), killed many 
household pets and separated others from their 
owners.11  According to one estimate, in the weeks 
following the tornado, 1308 pets were sheltered, of 
which 522 were reunited with their families and 745 
adopted.12  
Informants told us that the path of the storm dispro-
portionately destroyed rental units.  One reported 
that rentals constituted 80% of all units destroyed and 
damaged.13  Other informants indicated that as many 
as 4,000 of the 14,000-17,000 total residents displaced 
were lower income individuals.14  The tornado also 
destroyed 116 subsidized rental units owned by Joplin 
Housing Authority.  Almost immediately the rental 
market vacancy rate dropped to zero as displaced 
households absorbed all available units.  In early 
December 2011, the rental market was so tight that 
word of mouth had largely supplanted formal listings 
as the mechanism to ration the rare units that became 
available.15 
According to the Joplin Area Chamber of Commerce, 
more than 500 businesses sustained damage from the 
tornado, of which about half were totally destroyed, 
and roughly one-third were Chamber members.  At 
the six month marker, the Chamber estimated that at 
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least 400 of the damaged businesses had reopened at 
their original location or somewhere else locally, 40-50 
were at the permitting or rebuilding stage, and another 
30 did not intend to reopen.16  The Chamber knew the 
status of all but approximately 30 of the affected firms.  
In addition to many small businesses, the Walmart and 
Home Depot big box stores along Range Line Road—
anchors of the retail strip that is the core of the city’s 
economic base—were totally destroyed.17  Estimates of 
the temporary job losses associated with all of these 
business disruptions ranged from as low as 1200 to as 
high as 4500.18 
The NCDP team did not search out testimony about 
the disaster’s mental health impacts, but in mid-
November, Joplin mental health professionals told a 
national conference that they already had observed 
a number of unsettling trends which they attributed 
at least in part to widespread trauma.  These included 
significant increases in suicides, child sexual abuse, 
alcohol and drug use, domestic violence, problem 
gambling, rapes and criminal arrests, generally.19 
summary of majOr Damages/LOsses
cont’d
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joplin tornado map, may 22, 2011 (source: united states tornadoes,  
http://www.ustornadoes.com/2013/05/22/joplin-missouri-ef5-tornado-may-22-2011/)
Figure 1
the context Of reCOVery 
Recovery obviously does not occur in a vacuum or on a blank slate.   
Numerous environmental and other pre-disposing factors strongly influence 
the way a community perceives and confronts its recovery challenges and 
the resources the community can marshal for that purpose.
This section describes three sets of factors that 
appeared significant to the NCDP observers: (1) the 
nature of the damage sustained by different sectors of 
the community, (2) the social and political environment 
of Joplin, and (3) the broader community’s pre-tornado 
experiences.  Our overall impression was that these 
factors, collectively, created a favorable foundation for 
recovery.  It is important to keep in mind that our focus 
in this study begins long after the intense period of 
search and rescue, of performing life-saving medical 
procedures, clearing the roads, of restoring electricity 
and water, of reuniting families and saying farewell to 
those loved ones that were lost. 
The Nature of the Damage
As daunting as the challenges facing the City of Joplin 
have been all around, this disaster fortunately did not 
entail massive disruptions to basic utilities—electricity, 
gas, water and sewer—or massive threats to public 
safety or public health.  While the municipality itself 
lost two fire stations and a police station and various 
pieces of public safety equipment, it did not lose its 
command center or its city hall, nor did it suffer any 
long-term damage to its telecommunications facilities.  
Even more importantly, the storm’s intensity actually 
spared most underground utilities, by snapping trees 
like twigs rather than uprooting them en masse.  Steve 
Castaner, the FEMA representative for Emergency 
Support Function 14, told us, “What we’ve seen [i.e., 
FEMA] in other disasters is that trees are so uprooted, 
which destroys all of this infrastructure underground.  
And that’s a huge burden to overcome long-term 
because you don’t see it.  [Local officials] say, ‘well, 
we can’t turn on the water because we’ve got all these 
lines broken.  Or we can’t turn the water on because all 
the sewer lines are broken.  And there’s nowhere for it 
to go.  We don’t know where it’s all broken.  It’s going 
to take months for us to figure all that out.’”  Reflecting 
on the May 22 Joplin tornado, Castaner noted that 
from his perspective as the lead FEMA representative 
to Joplin for ESF #14, he did not perceive damage to 
underground utilities as one of the most significant 
problems. 
As much damage as the tornado did to the city’s busi-
ness community and a few spots along the Range Line 
Road retail district, it saved its worst fury for assets 
that did not generate a significant portion of the city’s 
revenue—the housing stock, the schools and St. John’s 
Regional Medical Center.  During the 2009 and 2010 
fiscal years, property tax revenues had made up less 
than 1.25% of the city’s total revenues.20  In contrast, 
sales and motor vehicles taxes made up 45-50% of 
total revenues.  Thus the impairment of assessed 
valuation caused by the destruction of so many homes 
and businesses did not fundamentally challenge the 
city’s ability to operate and pay its bills.  In fact, as of 
NCDP’s visit, the City Manager had observed a modest 
increase (10-15%) in sales tax revenues.21  Given the 
surge of permitting for repairs and reconstruction that 
began almost as quickly as the city cleared away the 
debris, municipal fee revenues also likely increased 
quite significantly. 
The facts that the municipality itself sustained a 
manageable amount of physical damage and did not 
appear to have taken a huge hit to its revenue stream 
were very positive factors for recovery.  As traumatic 
as the events were to members of municipal govern-
ment on a personal level, the threats to municipal 
government’s continued functioning were not as great 
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those faced by either the public school system (which 
lost much of its physical plant and for which property 
taxes made up about one third of total revenues for the 
2009-2010 and 2010-2011 school years) or the regional 
health care system (which lost nearly half of its acute 
care hospital beds in an instant).  
Without minimizing the challenges and burdens that 
municipal officials faced month after month, they 
were not, it appeared to us, placed in perpetual crisis 
mode.  They did not need to worry as much as officials 
in other disaster locales about the city’s ultimate 
economic viability or its solvency, or face a period of 
months without being able to demonstrate palpable, 
tangible improvements in physical conditions, or 
respond to a continuous exodus of overtaxed or 
overwhelmed citizens.  As they did not have to invest 
100 percent of their efforts to restoring a water or 
sewer system or preventing the outbreak of infectious 
disease, the political and administrative leadership 
of Joplin was able to devote a substantial portion of 
their personal resources—physical, emotional and 
political—to promoting and participating in various 
broad-based recovery efforts in the larger community.  
While the tornado did not impose upon the City of 
Joplin (or, as it turned out, either the school system 
or the health care system) physical damage beyond 
the context Of reCOVery 
cont’d
at the CrOssrOaDs Of LONg-term reCOVery: jOPLIN, mIssOurI sIx mONths after the may 22, 2011 tOrNaDO 9
residents of joplin, mo, walk west on 26th street after a tornado hit on sunday evening, may 22, 2011. (aP Photo/mike gullett)
Figure 2
its means to handle, the damage to housing exposed 
systemic underinsurance among both owners and 
renters.  Director of Emergency Management Keith 
Stammer reported that the great majority of the people 
who were totally uninsured were renters rather than 
homeowners.  Kim Cox, the CEO of the regional board 
of realtors, said that after all the FEMA “temporary 
housing units” were delivered, installed and occupied, 
her organization sent a team to do a five to six ques-
tion survey of the tenants.  Virtually all of them had 
been renters before the tornado, and 91% of them had 
no renters’ insurance.  Many informants raised the 
specter of dispossessed residents having insufficient 
funds to rebuild or to acquire the means of furnishing 
a new rental.  As will be discussed later, various com-
munity based efforts in Joplin already were attempting 
to address some of this shortage in private insurance 
by mobilizing massive donations of household items, 
construction materials, and volunteer labor to rebuild 
and repair what insurance would not pay for.
Approaching six months after the disaster, several 
informants reflected palpable concern about both 
the psychological consequences of that milestone 
and how the pace of recovery would impact indi-
vidual residents’ decisions to remain in, or return to 
the context Of reCOVery 
cont’d
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context Of reCOVery 
Joplin.  In the words of Gary Duncan, then the CEO of 
Freeman Health System (the hospital system that did 
not suffer extensive physical damage), “I think we’re 
going to know a lot more next spring [Spring 2012] 
about whether or not people stay, because psychologi-
cally, post disaster trauma or stress…really hits at 
about six months.  We’re in that zone now where we’re 
going to see if people are finally going to go ‘Okay, I’ve 
had enough of this, I’m out of here,’ or if we are going 
to be able to keep them in place…If the jobs don’t 
come back soon enough, they could leave town and I 
don’t think we know what’s going to happen yet.”  The 
scale of physical destruction and loss of life “felt” large 
to residents.  According to Jane Cage, a Joplin busi-
nesswoman who served as a co-chair of the Citizens 
Advisory Recovery Team, “Everybody in Joplin, almost, 
knows somebody who died.  I mean everybody knows 
someone who lost his house, it’s unavoidable.”  This 
reflected a widespread identification with the losses 
throughout the city.  
Finally, the scale of this disaster relative to the physical 
geography of Joplin may have elicited a larger and 
more enduring outpouring of assistance and support 
from all sectors of society than would have met a 
smaller scale disaster.  In this regard, Keith Stammer 
noted that the May 22 tornado proved “It is quite pos-
sible to have a disaster that’s too big to fail.”
The Social and Political Environment
Intense polarization or political conflict often con-
strains recovery in post-disaster settings.22  In our 
Joplin interviews, we saw virtually no evidence of such 
conflict in the city’s civic or political culture.  There was 
no evidence of a well-developed network of commu-
nity-based organizations or interest groups that as-
serted, aspired to, or contested leadership or political 
influence.  Our informants did not make disparaging or 
backhanded remarks about other sectors of the com-
munity.  They unanimously were confident that Joplin’s 
elected officials would act with dispatch to pursue the 
recovery strategies that citizens had proposed during 
fall 2011, and that they would not purposefully defer 
critical recovery decisions until after April 2012 local 
elections.  
While disputed political terrain undoubtedly exists 
in Joplin as it does everywhere else, it appears to be 
a less significant factor in recovery in Joplin than in 
other communities.  Michelle Ducre, the Southwest 
Missouri Director of Development for the Community 
Foundation of the Ozarks, in comparing Joplin to her 
home town of New Orleans, said, “I don’t see the poli-
tics or the red tape or the craziness.  [New Orleans is] 
still not fully recovered because of the silliness that’s 
going on.  [In Joplin], I’m the outsider looking in.  I’m 
not a native of the community.  But here’s what’s so 
cool.  If you want a seat at the table you pretty much 
have it.  There’s not been anybody that I’ve seen in the 
seven years I’ve been here denied access to the pro-
cess if they wanted to be a part of it.”
Several informants noted that the community gener-
ally has a “take care of yourself, don’t wait around 
for others to take care of you” approach to life.  Gary 
Pulsipher, the CEO of Mercy St. John’s Regional 
Medical Center put it this way: “there is a little bit of a 
Midwestern kind of spirit…that it’s just up to you.  You 
can’t expect a lot of people to come in and help…this 
is the hand we’ve been dealt so let’s just move on.  You 
can complain and whine about it, but it’s just what we 
have to do so let’s get after it.”  In the words of the City 
Manager Mark Rohr, “I grew up in Ohio.  And I thought 
Ohio was conservative, [but] Ohio looks like California 
compared to Missouri.  So you’re not going to get a 
lot of fluffy stuff…there’s a real conservative pragmatic 
nature.”  
Many people expressed the belief that it was the Chris-
tian character of the community (at least as much as 
the Midwestern character) that had made Joplin resi-
dents come to each other’s assistance on such a  mas-
sive and sustained basis, essentially without regard to
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what state and federal government had done.  Joplin 
is an environment in which faith-based organizations 
appear to be acknowledged and recognized as routine, 
dependable and essential actors in the delivery of 
social services, and as partners of local government 
and the schools.  As described in the following section, 
before the disaster, local churches had been signifi-
cant partners of both city government and the public 
the context Of reCOVery 
cont’d
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context Of reCOVery 
school system in ongoing projects and programs.  As 
Jay St. Clair, the community outreach minister for a 
local church pointed out, “this faith component, this 
undercurrent that was there before [the tornado], that 
was building.  The tornado has stirred that up…it didn’t 
create it, it just stirred up what was already there and 
magnified it.”23    
At least two major meetings of the Citizens Advisory 
Recovery Team were hosted by local churches.  Faith-
based organizations also have been a major source 
for tapping into both volunteer labor and donations of 
cash and materials on a regional and national basis, 
and played a leading role in disaster case manage-
ment (as they do in many areas of the country).  Wendi 
Douglas, the president of Jasper County Community 
Organizations Active in Disasters, put it this way: “I 
would say churches are almost like a triage center 
for the disaster victims.  They’re able either to meet 
survivor needs or send them where they need to be.  
Churches are able to say, ‘Here’s what we have for you 
today, you might want to try this location or that loca-
tion.’  And I think that they do that spiritually as well. 
Maybe a minister or a counselor at the Church would 
interview somebody who has issues and then establish 
if they need to keep meeting at that location or if they 
need to see a licensed professional.”24 
Joplin is an environment in which the business com-
munity, as embodied in the Joplin Area Chamber of 
Commerce, is a full partner with local government in 
local and regional economic development.  According 
to its website, the Joplin Chamber was one of thirty-
eight chambers in the United States (out of a total of 
6,936) to receive the highest level “five-star” accredita-
tion from the United States Chamber of Commerce.  
According to membership director Christine Bryant, 
it has held that five-star rating for the last twenty-five 
years.  Its membership includes approximately 1,000 
firms, 80% of which have fewer than ten employees. 
It has a strong regional focus that is reflected in pro-
grams like the Joplin Regional Prosperity Initiative—an 
economic growth initiative initially focused on 
Missouri’s Jasper and Newton Counties but now 
expanded to include another five counties in Missouri, 
Kansas and Oklahoma for which Joplin is the regional 
economic center.25  Our Joplin Chamber informants 
believe that as a result of its regional relationships, 
other regional chambers spontaneously offered them 
aid after the tornado, when 178 of the Joplin Chamber 
members were devastated and many suspended their 
dues payments.  Several of these sister chambers 
bought one-year courtesy memberships in the Joplin 
Area Chamber of Commerce in order to help buffer its 
loss of revenues.  Others loaned staff to help the Joplin 
Chamber assist its devastated members. 
Without exception, our informants had immense faith 
in the power and durability of Joplin.  The tornado 
had not, in their view, fundamentally diminished or 
impaired the retail economic engine that makes Joplin 
the regional hub for southwest Missouri and the sur-
rounding counties in Kansas, Oklahoma and Arkansas, 
a fact reflected in the data that the permanent resident 
population of Joplin is close to 50,000, whereas the 
average daytime population is between 250,000 and 
270,000.26  
A highly involved and visible governor was another 
noteworthy factor.  Before NCDP’s fieldwork, we had 
learned of Democratic Governor Jay Nixon’s rapid 
efforts to procure an array of state funding to assist in 
Joplin’s long-term recovery.  That included funds for 
the massive debris removal and for a pediatric trauma 
treatment facility, low income housing tax credits and 
other housing subsidies.  It also included state income 
tax credits to encourage voluntary donations to several 
relief funds designed to assist local businesses (see the 
section “Marshaling Recovery Resources”).  A January 
2012 Joplin Globe article reported that Governor Nixon 
had been to Joplin sixty-seven times since the tornado, 
or every three and a half days on average.27 
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Governor Nixon’s personal attention to Joplin appears 
even more significant in light of the fact that Joplin 
and the surrounding counties had voted overwhelm-
ingly for his Republican opponent (approximately 
60%) in the 2008 General Election, that Republic 
candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives 
recently have garnered local majorities of 65-75%, and 
that Republican candidates for the district seats in the 
Missouri legislature periodically run unopposed.28 
Gary Duncan, then CEO of Freeman Health System, 
recalled a particularly upbeat exchange between 
Governor Nixon and Joplin civic leaders: “The gov-
ernor was a huge part of the momentum down here.  
He was here every other day.  He was saying ‘Let’s get 
‘er done.’  In fact, I remember at one meeting he said, 
‘I haven’t overruled so many regulations in all my life 
as the last three weeks.’  And we sat up and gave him a 
hand and said, ‘Right on, Governor.  Keep it up.  Keep 
it up.’”
Prior Experiences That May Have 
Helped Joplin Act Quickly and  
Effectively
The Columbia researchers observed evidence that 
prior collaborative efforts among different sectors 
of the community had, at a minimum, accustomed 
diverse stakeholders to working with each other 
and, at best, created genuine relationships of trust 
and mutual reliance.  It appears that whether as a 
matter of policy or by good fortune, many elements 
of the Joplin community have subscribed to the 
dictum of Rob O’Brian, president of the Joplin Area 
Chamber of Commerce: “A disaster is no place to form 
relationships.”29 
Joplin’s downtown renewal began in 2001 with a 
formal planning process that involved much citizen 
participation and culminated in a formal downtown 
revitalization plan.  In the last decade, many store 
fronts along Main Street have had facelifts that 
preserved and restored architecturally distinctive 
features.  In addition, the community has embraced 
and supported a monthly “Third Thursday” when 
downtown stores with limited regular hours open for 
business and restaurants stay open late, accompa-
nied typically by an art walk, food vendors, and live 
music.  Various downtown-oriented civic groups have 
emerged to promote a more vibrant downtown.  City 
Manager Mark Rohr suggested that the history of 
public participation in downtown revitalization was 
a precursor to the Citizens Advisory Recovery Team 
(CART) that emerged in June 2011 to consider a long-
term disaster recovery strategy.  “…The downtown…
was extremely run down a few years ago,” said Rohr, 
“and now – it looks nice.  It’s not a full commercial 
success, which I acknowledge, but it’s better than what 
it was.  But what that has done is it showed people 
possibilities.”30 
Bright Futures has two key elements.  One is a 
clearinghouse mechanism, in which teachers and 
other school system employees identify resources 
that individual students need: the school partners, in 
response, attempt to satisfy those needs.  The second 
element involves customized programs in which the 
partners provide their schools’ students with men-
toring, tutoring, reading assistance, volunteers to sup-
port school and parent-teacher organization activities 
and trips, and in which churches incorporate prayer 
for their partner schools in their services.  Based upon 
how well Bright Futures has been received locally, the 
Joplin Schools shared the framework with other school 
districts and ultimately set up a stand-alone 501(c) (3) 
corporation called Bright Futures USA to disseminate 
the concept nationally.31   
We also heard from Jay St. Clair about what he con-
sidered a very successful pre-tornado collaboration 
between the City of Joplin and the College Heights 
Christian Church, where he is the community outreach 
minister.  It involved an area known locally as “the 
Last Resort,” described by St. Clair as “the epicenter 
the study
cont’d
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of drug activity and prostitution and violence” in that 
section of Joplin, a person’s “last stop before jail or the 
streets.”32  This collaboration entailed church acquisi-
tion of a small apartment building through a 501(c)
(3) corporation called “God’s Resort,” the creation of 
the city’s first “neighborhood improvement district,” 
neighborhood clean-up and home improvements by 
church volunteers, repairs to streets, sidewalks and 
streetlights, increased police presence and increased 
social services.33 
As a result of a recent unfortunate history of major ice 
storms and relatively small tornados, the Joplin area 
has an existing association known as Jasper County 
Community Organizations Active in Disasters (COAD), 
established in 2005.34  COAD is an all-volunteer orga-
nization with 25-30 permanent members, 10-15 active 
members, but no paid staff or public funding.35  Its 
mission is to “mitigate, prepare, respond and recover” 
from disasters.  Year in and year out, it has conducted 
monthly or quarterly meetings.  On the “prepare” 
side of its mission, COAD worked actively with the 
City of Joplin and Jasper County emergency manage-
ment department in pandemic flu education and 
training.36  For the COAD, mitigation typically means 
things like trimming trees in anticipation of ice storms, 
cleaning household chimneys, etc.  COAD handles the 
“recovery” portion of its mission by standing up a 
Long Term Recovery Committee (LTRC) when there is a 
calamity.  The function of the LTRC is to meet individual 
and household needs above and beyond what is avail-
able from the whole panoply of government disaster 
assistance programs--a combination of providing 
case management and marshaling private resources. 
As described in the section “Marshaling Recovery 
Resources,” the Long Term Recovery Committee was 
constituted within days of the May 22 disaster.
Other existing collaborative relationships across 
diverse elements of the community also likely set 
the stage for various recovery-related activities.  The 
contractual arrangement whereby the Joplin Area 
Chamber of Commerce performs economic develop-
ment functions for the City of Joplin, along with the 
previously mentioned Joplin Regional Prosperity 
Initiative led to the creation of, and strongly influenced 
the deliberations of the “economic development 
sector” of the Citizens Advisory Recovery Team.37  
The Jasper and Newton Counties Community Health 
Collaborative—an association that includes Joplin’s 
two major hospital systems, the city and county health 
departments, the United Way and other organiza-
tions interested in promoting the “Healthy People” 
agenda of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services—has been active since 1999 in coordinating 
efforts that foster walking, healthy eating and ces-
sation of smoking.38  The Collaborative operates 
within the framework of The Alliance of Southwest 
Missouri, a state-recognized umbrella organization 
for approximately 200 non-profit organizations in 
Jasper and Newton Counties that work to “strengthen 
families and prevent unhealthy and unsafe behav-
iors.”39  Several informants told us that for at least 
15 years, an informal association called the Joplin 
Ministerial Alliance has promoted cooperative relation-
ships among Joplin’s numerous denominations and 
churches, primarily through monthly prayer meetings 
of the participating pastors.40  Finally, the public school 
system had conducted a leadership training program 
several months before the tornado.  This eight-session, 
30-hour program had provided a comprehensive 
overview of the challenges facing the public schools 
to a diverse cross-section of approximately 30 com-
munity leaders from the business sector, health care 
systems, faith-based organizations, charitable organi-
zations and local government.41  As discussed under 
“Catalytic Recovery Efforts,” this leadership program 
helped both the school system and other community 
leaders respond energetically to the school superinten-
dent’s challenge to begin the 2011-2012 school year on 
schedule.  
major reCOVery mILestONes
The Joplin Tornado Recovery Chronology (Table 1) lists many of the major 
decisions that parties had made by the time of our visit, and extends that 







May 22 0 Tornado
May 22 0 Joplin Tornado added to existing Presidential Disaster Declaration DR-1980.
May 24 2 FEMA Opens First Disaster Recovery Center in Joplin.
May 24 2 School Superintendent announces schools will reopen August 17 on time.
May 24 2 Long Term Recovery Committee Established as subcommittee of COAD; fund account created.
May 25 3
Sisters of Mercy Health System announces it will build new hospital in Joplin to replace 
destroyed St. John’s Regional Medical Center, and that it will attempt to keep many St. John’s 
employees in the Mercy System until then.
May 27 5 Bright Futures Joplin and other organizations establish RebuildJoplin.org.
May 30 8 Community Foundation of Southwest Missouri establishes Joplin Tornado First Response. 
May 30 8
Freeman Health Systems decides to accelerate build-out of floors 5& 6 in Freeman West and 
add other expanded capacity.
Jun 10 19 Jolie Pitt Foundation donates $500,000 to Joplin Recovery Fund.
Jun 20 29 Danforth Foundation donates $500,000 to Joplin Tomorrow Foundation.
Jun 24 33
State Department of Economic Development allocates $7 million of Missouri business income 
tax credits to encourage $14 million of donations to Joplin Area Chamber of Commerce 
Business Recovery Loan Fund, Joplin Tomorrow Foundation and other recovery programs.
TABLE 1. JOPLIN TORNADO RECOVERY CHRONOLOG Y (2011-2012)








Jun 30 39 Citizens Advisory Recovery Team (CART) holds first formal meeting.
Jul 5 44
City of Joplin and FEMA announce that up to 346 temporary units to be installed at site  
near regional airport.
Jul 6 45
Governor Nixon announces $2 million allocated for new Child Trauma Treatment Center in 
Joplin.
Jul 12 51 First CART Community Input Meeting.
Jul 19 58 Governor Nixon announces $90 million of low income housing tax credits over ten years.
Aug 1 71
Governor Nixon announces that State of Missouri will absorb entire non-federal share of 
debris removal.
Aug 5 75 First families move into FEMA temporary housing units near airport.
Aug 7 77
Joplin completes removal of 3 million cubic yards of debris, in time to quality for 90%  
federal share.
Aug 9 79
United Arab Emirates announces donation of $1 million to help give every Joplin HS  
student a personal computer when school reopens.
Aug 16 86 Second CART Community Input Meeting.
Aug 16 86 Mercy System announces location of new hospital.
Aug 17 87 Joplin public schools open on schedule for the 2011-2012 school year.
Sep 13 104
The Community Foundation of Southwest Missouri awards $300,000 from the Joplin  





Builders and approximately 13,000 volunteers erect seven new homes in connection with 
television program Extreme Makeover: Home Edition.
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CART presents its recommendations, “Listening to Joplin,” to City Council, which accepts 
the report and charters an “Implementation Task Force” to develop a plan of action  to move 
forward (see 1-19-2012).
Nov 9 171 Walmart store destroyed in tornado reopens for business.
Nov 30 192
Joplin Council approves first eight projects for assistance with Low Income Housing Tax 
Credits.
Dec 1 193
Reopening on Main Street of “Dude’s Donuts,” a community institution in business for 57 
years.
Dec 31 223
Lilly Endowment, Inc. of Indianapolis grants $1.5 to the Community Foundation of Southwest 
Missouri to promote home construction and rebuilding.
2012
Jan 4 227
City of Joplin announces it has issued building permits for the repair and reconstruction of 
more than half of all the homes destroyed 5-22-11.
Jan 4 227
FEMA awards $20 million to support construction of new Mercy Hospital Joplin and nearly  
$2 million to Joplin Schools for various repair and construction projects.
Jan 10 233 Ozark Center dedicates “Will’s Place,” the pediatric trauma center announced in early July.
Jan 11 234 Home Depot store destroyed in tornado reopens for business.
Jan 19 242
At a joint meeting of the Joplin City Council, the Joplin Board of Education, the board of  
directors of the Joplin Area Chamber of Commerce and the Duquesne Board of Alderman,  
all four bodies unofficially endorse the recommendations of the Implementation Task Force.
Jan 20 243
Joplin awarded $45.2 million for recovery from supplemental Community Development  
Block Grant appropriation.
Jan 29 252 Demolition commences on St. John’s Regional Medical Center.
Jan 30 253
Ozark Center, Freeman Health System’s mental health operation, reopened the last of  
the eight facilities damaged or destroyed by tornado.
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White House announces that President Obama to deliver address at Joplin High School  
graduation ceremonies.
Mar 8 291
The Community Foundation of Southwest Missouri awards $1.5 million from the Joplin 
Recovery Fund to a local consortium to build 100 homes largely with volunteer labor.
Mar 13 296 Freeman opens fifth floor in Freeman Hospital West Hall Tower.
Mar 19 302
Joplin City Council, following on CART Implementation Task Force Recommendations,  
adopts changes to its zoning and building design guidelines.
Apr 2 316
After receiving letters of interest from six firms, City of Joplin enters into formal negotiations 
with a Texas real estate development company to act as “master developer” to initiate up to 
$800 million of redevelopment projects for the City.
Apr 3 317
Voters in the Joplin School District approved a $62 million bond issue to fund the  
construction of new schools to replace those destroyed by tornado.
Apr 12 326
Governor Nixon gives special approval enabling Mercy Health System to build a custom 
interstate highway interchange for new Joplin hospital.
Apr 18 332 Joplin Tornado First Response Fund opens for first round of funding applications.
Apr 27 341
City of Joplin makes final curbside pickup of residential debris (after this date, homeowners 
must cart debris themselves to approved disposal sites).  
Apr 5 349
City of Joplin opens a new fire station that had been approved before the tornado, viewed as 
an expansion of capacity rather than as a replacement for the two destroyed by the tornado.
TABLE 1. JOPLIN TORNADO RECOVERY CHRONOLOG Y (2011-2012) (CONTINUED)
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catalytic reCOVery effOrts
Within days of the tornado many different elements among the Joplin  
community made critical decisions that have had a profound impact on the 
course of recovery: creating and sustaining momentum, encouraging people 
who lost their homes to stay in the area and rebuild their lives in Joplin, and 
fostering public support for specific programmatic initiatives. This section 
discusses the major recovery decisions and actions that were most signifi-
cant to our informants.
Expedited Debris Removal
The City of Joplin, in collaboration with FEMA, the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Governor, the 
Missouri National Guard, and other state agencies 
moved heaven and earth to remove the estimated 
three million cubic yards of tornado debris within 68 
days.42  This amount of debris was slightly more than 
the amount resulting from the destruction of the World 
Trade Center on September 11, 2001 (and about 7% 
and 3% of the debris resulting from Hurricanes Andrew 
and Katrina, respectively).43  On May 29, the federal 
government originally had committed to pick up 75 
percent of the debris removal costs incurred through 
August 7, 2011 (75 days after the tornado).  This effec-
tively left 68 days during which the federal government 
would absorb the lion’s share of the cleanup costs.  The 
urgency to meet that deadline only increased when 
the federal government increased its share of costs 
incurred by August 7 to 90 percent.44 
This effort, referred to as “Expedited Debris Removal,” 
had several ramifications.  First, the effort saved the 
city and state government millions of dollars, by 
accomplishing most of the debris removal during a 
window when the non-federal matching share was 
reduced from 25% to 10%.  Furthermore, the tangible 
evidence that all levels of government were working to 
clear the decks at a breakneck pace encouraged home-
owners and other real estate and business owners to 
move forward with their reconstruction and rebuilding 
planning.  Several informants also believed that the 
rapid clearing of lots contributed to the city govern-
ment’s decision to lift what had been an unpopular 
60-day moratorium on new construction (but not 
repairs) that began June 23.  Lifting the ban in turn 
contributed to a public perception that government 
would support and encourage rather than stymie their 
efforts to restore their properties.45 
The removal of virtually all debris by early August also 
had an undeniable positive psychological impact.  As 
noted before, the empty appearance of the scar zone 
at six months evoked a newly-annexed area that was 
being developed for the first time.  This was in sharp 
contrast to the “war zone” analogy that many of our 
informants (and media reports) used to describe 
central Joplin in the weeks immediately following the 
storm.  The removal of constant reminders of destruc-
tion allowed residents, developers, planners and other 
government officials to visualize the possibilities for 
rebuilding, improvements and renewal.
Comparing the efficacy of the city government in 
December 2011 to during the debris removal period, 
City Manager Mark Rohr observed, “We’re in control, 
but it’s less control than we had before.  And let me 
explain what I mean by that.  I can make you clean 
your lot up [but] I can’t make you rebuild your prop-
erty.  What I can do is try to give you some level of 
confidence that your neighbor is going to rebuild his 
property and things are going to come back and things 
are going to be all right.  So my role and the city’s role 
at this point is to try to present as much stability to
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you and to let you know how things are going to come 
back and how things are going to be better in certain 
respects so that you feel comfortable being part of the 
masses that are going to rebuild.  So we’re in charge, 
but it’s actually, ironically enough, less control than we 
had during debris removal.”46 
School Reopening Decision
Less than 48 hours after the tornado Dr. C.J. Huff, the 
schools superintendent, announced that the public 
schools would reopen for the 2011-12 school year on 
schedule, in just 85 days.  By the time Huff made this 
announcement, he and his senior staff already had 
obtained a physical assessment of what facilities the 
school system had lost—six of ten schools severely 
damaged or destroyed, including Joplin High School.  
Although some of his information later turned out to 
be inadequate (and the damage was greater than he 
originally thought), this rapid damage assessment was 
critical in his determination that the school system had 
enough resources left to cobble together a package 
of facilities by August 17.  Ashley Micklethwaite, then 




president of the Board of Education, confirmed that Dr. 
Huff made this announcement without consulting with 
the Board.47  
Huff and his team met the August 17 deadline with a 
95% student retention rate, indicating that the school 
system had lost only slightly more students than it 
typically did over summer vacation.48  Several infor-
mants specifically mentioned that Huff’s decision to 
reopen schools on time not only motivated high levels 
of community participation, but probably kept many 
people from moving out of the area.49  
When asked why he was comfortable making such 
an ambitious commitment in the depths of the post-
storm chaos, Huff recalled his thought process: “It was 
important to start our schools on time for a number of 
reasons.  One of them was to get our kids out of the 
rubble as soon as we possibly could, get them in safe 
places, and start doing the mental health assessments 
that needed to be done and providing what support 
we could to kids and families.”50  He also made it clear 
that his decision to make this pledge was based upon 
a high degree of confidence that he had a strong and 
deep network of supportive relationships throughout 
the community that would enable the school system to 
make good on it. 
Huff indicated that the school district had been 
engaged in major facilities planning activities for 
months before the tornado, and already had thought 
through many of the projects it is now beginning to 
put into place, including safe rooms in all the schools. 
“We’d been talking about 21st century education prior 
to the storm and what new facilities need to look like.  
Now it’s actually gotten easier from the standpoint that 
we get to create the vision.  We already had a vision 
but now we’ve really solidified what we want the vision 
to look like.  Now we can build the building around 
that vision as opposed to trying to fit the vision into an 
existing box.  We did a lot of strategic planning prior to 
this.  We’d been having dialogue around facilities and 
programming with our community.  We all know what 
they want us to do.  So 95 percent of the deliberation 
already had happened before May 22nd.”51 
According to Huff, the school district was well into 
a long-term construction program when the storm 
hit, and this also played a big role in his decision to 
reopen on schedule.  “We had the relationships there.  
We’d just been through two and a half hard years of 
construction projects with three brand new middle 
schools.  We had relationships with architects and gen-
eral contractors and knew their capacity and what they 
were capable of accomplishing.”  This also extended to 
relationships developed with city permitting, fire and 
health officials.  “If there was ever a roadblock I just 
had to make a phone call and say ‘hey, we’re getting 
hung up on this one, can you help us out?’  It would be 
taken care of within the minute.”52 
Ashley Micklethwaite, the President of the Board of 
Education, expressed essentially the same sentiment:  
“The [School] Board knows our City Council members 
and vice versa.  We know our city manager.  We have 
informal dinners with them.  We didn’t have to build 
those bridges…that trust was already there.  Our 
board trusts our administrators.  We trust each other.  
There’s not a lot of internal politics and fighting for the 
most part.  It rears its head up every once in a while.  
Especially as people get tired.  But what we had in 
place allowed us to do what we did.”53 
Other Joplin Schools Actions
Although the decision to reopen the schools on time 
was the most ambitious commitment the Joplin 
Schools made, it was not their only significant decision 
in the immediate aftermath of the storm.  With the 
health and safety of the district’s children in mind, the 
school district decided not only to hold summer school 
on schedule, but to extend that program from its 
normal termination on July 4 through the end of July, 
and to provide transportation for the students for the 
first time.  According to Huff, the district did not know 
at the time (and still did not know as of our interview) 
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whether any state or federal agency ultimately 
would reimburse the district for these extraordinary 
expenses.  They made the decision to dip into the 
school system’s emergency reserves anyway.
During the summer, families that had lost their homes 
to the tornado and relocated outside of the city limits 
learned that Joplin Schools would provide their chil-
dren free transportation to attend what would have 
been their neighborhood school in Joplin.  According 
to Huff, the schools had made good on that offer to 
students living in the FEMA temporary housing near 
the regional airport, as well as in Galena, Kansas and 
Neosho, MO.54  The CART co-chair Jane Cage reported 
that “at least 400 kids” were receiving free transporta-
tion under this program.55  This was another instance 
where the school system subordinated certainty of 
reimbursement to what it perceived as the right thing 
to do for its children and their families. 
During fall of 2011, as the school system was strug-
gling to adapt to the temporary physical plant it had 
assembled over the summer, give the students an 
educational experience that was as close to normal 
as possible under the circumstances, and address the 
emotional trauma of students who had experienced 
the tornado, the system decided to offer a first time 
“winter camp” in association with the YMCA and Boys 
and Girls Clubs.  This full-day, meals-included program 
for grades K-12 ran for the eight school holidays 
bracketing Christmas.  The district pursued this largely 
out of concern, based upon historical evidence, that 
the holidays would see a significant uptick in child 
abuse and neglect.56  
For all that the school system did to provide safe 
havens for its student population and to provide 
motivations for parents to keep their families nearby 
while the system rebuilt itself, Huff and the Board 
of Education did not overlook the concerns of the 
teachers and school system staff.  Soon after the 
tornado, despite the hit taken by the property tax base 
that generated a substantial portion of the school 
system’s revenue, Huff informed the entire district staff 
that he and the Board would not revisit the previously 
approved 2011-2012 school year budget or lay off 
anyone.  
Health Systems Decisions
Within the first week to ten days following the tornado, 
the two major hospitals in Joplin announced decisions 
that were significant not just for their own organiza-
tions but also for local government and for individuals, 
businesses, non-profit organizations and faith-based 
organizations considering what Joplin might look like 
at the end of the recovery process.
In a matter of days, the CEO of the Sisters of Mercy 
Health System (Mercy), the owner of the destroyed St. 
John’s Regional Medical Center, announced that the 
system would build a new, comparable size hospital in 
Joplin.  Mercy also offered the St. John’s professional 
staff strong financial incentives to stay in the area 
and in the Mercy “family” until the new hospital was 
up and running and ready to employ them.  Mercy 
announced the site of the new hospital in August.57   
Later that month, as it proceeded with planning for 
the demolition of St. John’s, Mercy began discussions 
with Joplin Schools and the city government about 
donating portions of the St. John’s site for a new 
school building and a new city park, respectively.58 
Under Mercy’s so-called “talent share” program, other 
regional units of the Mercy System could employ 
displaced St. John’s staff at those facilities’ normal 
rates, and Mercy made up the difference between what 
the person had been earning at St. John’s and what the 
other Mercy unit paid them.59  This spared many of St. 
John’s nearly 2500 employees the prospect of unem-
ployment, relocation or a reduction in income.60  
St. John’s management strongly encouraged its staff 
to exhaust all possibilities for finding a temporary 
position in a regional Mercy System facility—even if 
that entailed a long commute—before proposing to 
participate in the Talent Share program through a com-
petitive hospital.61  All but a handful of St. John’s staff 
members found a posting in another Mercy unit, to 
the chagrin of Mercy’s Joplin competitor, the Freeman 
Health System, which had a great need to augment its 
staff.62
Mercy had been trying to restructure and reposition St. 
John’s since acquiring control of that facility eighteen 
months before the tornado; issues included certain 
competitive disadvantages, an older building with 
primarily double-occupancy rooms, and a demoral-
ized staff.63  Abruptly, the tornado forced Mercy to 
remedy its St. John’s problems in a newly-designed 
and conceived facility as opposed to within an existing 
physical plant.  This is similar to the challenge and 
opportunity the tornado offered the school system.  
Fortunately for Joplin, Mercy was well covered by 
insurance for both physical damage and business 
interruption at St. John’s Regional Medical Center.  St. 
Johns’ CEO Gary Pulsipher estimated that insurance 
would cover significantly more than half of the cost 
of constructing the new hospital and supporting the 
St. John’s staff for three years within the talent share 
program. 
Furthermore, Mercy had the corporate, system-level 
resources to dedicate what amounted to a SWAT team 
of analysts and executives to make the fast decisions 
to remain in Joplin and offer security to the profes-
sional staff.  Gary Pulsipher’s remark, “I can’t imagine 
trying to do that as a stand-alone hospital,” under-
scored that Joplin’s recovery may have benefitted from 
the fact that it was his own hospital that was destroyed 
rather than nearby Freeman West, which was not part 
of a large multi-state network of hospitals.64  
The Board of Directors of Freeman Health System, 
which was shouldering (and would continue to bear) 
the brunt of the loss of hospital capacity, also quickly 
declared its intentions.  Within one week, Freeman 
decided to begin building out floors five and six in 
the Freeman West Hospital Hall Tower Building, which 
would add as many as 58 private beds.  Freeman 
already had been considering when and how to deploy 
those unfinished floors, but the loss of the St. John’s 
capacity, the stresses that placed on Freeman as 
the sole surviving acute care hospital in Joplin, and 
Mercy’s decision to build a new hospital—one with 
many more single-occupancy rooms—caused Freeman 
to accelerate its build-out of floors five and six.  In that 
same period shortly after the tornado, the Freeman 
Board also decided to immediately set up a twelve-bed 
step down intensive care unit and add twenty more 
psychiatric beds at Freeman Hospital East.
The CEO of Freeman Health System, Gary Duncan, 
expressed some frustration that even though “people 
realize that Freeman’s really pumping out the service 
here,” his organization’s yeoman efforts to serve the 
community since the destruction of St. John’s had 
not garnered nearly the same degree of positive buzz 
as Mercy’s periodic announcements related to the 
construction of the new hospital.65  It was evident from 
several informants’ remarks that the two hospital 
systems are intensely competitive, and in more than 
just a business sense.  FEMA’s Steve Castaner per-
ceived that “the two-hospital dynamic here runs to the 
bone in this community.  It drives a lot of decisions.”66  
Explaining how (if at all) this rivalry between two of 
the region’s most venerable institutions and largest 
employers has impacted the recovery process so far is 
beyond our data, but an extremely interesting question 
for future research.
Extreme Makeover: Home Edition
A number of parties collaborated to assemble the 
sites, building materials and labor to build seven 
homes through the television program Extreme 
Makeover: Home Edition. According to John Joines 
of Economic Security Corporation of Southwest Area, 
his organization assembled approximately $95,000 
of funding to acquire eleven 50-feet wide lots on a 
single street.  More than half of that amount came 
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from the Congressionally-chartered Neighborhood 
Reinvestment Corporation (doing business as 
NeighborWorks America) and the remainder from 
other donors.67  The City of Joplin consolidated those 
properties and then re-subdivided them into seven 
75-80 feet wide lots in order to satisfy the require-
ments of Extreme Makeover.  All the building materials 
and labor were donated.  The seven new homes 
were constructed over the period of one week in late 
October, with an average cost basis (including $13,000 
for each site) of roughly $225,000.68  Even without 
assigning any value to the efforts of the Extreme 
Makeover production team, this project represented an 
aggregate donation of nearly $1.6 million.  It also pro-
vided the city with a lot of positive national publicity.
joplin residents stand for a moment of silence during a memorial service. (aP Photo/Charlie riedel)
Figure 7
Many of our informants observed that Joplin benefitted from a large network of 
connections to financial and human resources with which to pursue  
reconstruction, rebuilding and recovery in general.  
That network included the Sisters of Mercy Health 
System based in suburban St. Louis, which provided 
the resources not only to replace St. John’s Regional 
Medical Center but to supplement the income of most 
of its displaced work force for an extended period of 
time.  It also included the Missouri state government. 
Within two months of the tornado, Governor Nixon’s 
office announced in rapid succession state funding 
addressing long-term community mental health needs, 
housing development, economic development and the 
fiscal burden of the debris removal process. 
Celebrities and philanthropists with personal ties to 
southwestern Missouri made signature donations to 
support recovery efforts, and numerous individual and 
corporate donors followed suit.  The Ozark Gateway 
Association of Realtors and the Joplin Area Chamber 
of Commerce received financial and material contribu-
tions from sister organizations from across Missouri 
and out of state.  Economic Security Corporation of 
Southwest Area played a major role in assembling the 
funding for acquisition of the “Extreme Makeover” 
building sites and, as the administrator of the Jasper 
County Housing Authority, in providing rental units 
to families dispossessed when the tornado destroyed 
Joplin Housing Authority units.  Several prominent 
local organizations (including Joplin Schools, 
Economic Security Corporation and the Joplin Area 
Chamber of Commerce) collaborated in quickly 
bringing online the RebuildJoplin.org clearinghouse to 
facilitate the matching of needs and resources, while 
numerous local non-profit organizations and churches 
activated their own regional and national networks to 
mobilize donations of cash, materials and volunteers.
Within a few months of the Columbia team’s visit, 
federal agencies also had contributed substantially to 
the recovery effort.  HUD awarded Joplin more than 
$45 million for recovery from a supplemental appro-
priation of Community Development Block Grant funds 
in January 2012, and FEMA awarded more than $125 
million to various Joplin entities under the Stafford 
Act’s Public Assistance Program.  The remainder of this 
section highlights the primary non-federal financial 
contributions to the recovery effort.
Major Philanthropic Actions
On June 10, the Jolie Pitt Foundation donated 
$500,000 to the Joplin Recovery Fund established by 
the Community Foundation of the Ozarks (CFO).  CFO 
created this fund to “focus on the mid- to long-term 
redevelopment efforts of non-profits working on the 
civic, economic, human services and educational 
needs created by the disaster.”69  In its first round of 
awards (September 13, 2011) the Joplin Recovery Fund 
disbursed a total of $300,000 to local not-for-profit 
organizations.70  
On June 20, former U.S. Senator from Missouri 
John Danforth announced a $500,000 donation by 
the Danforth Foundation to the Joplin Tomorrow 
Foundation, a new entity whose goal was to raise $10 
million to help tornado-impacted businesses recover 
and attract new businesses into the region.  Donors to 
the Joplin Tomorrow Foundation also are eligible for 
credits against Missouri business income tax obliga-
tions (see “Major Recovery Funding from the State of 
Missouri”).
Other major philanthropy included a $100,000 dona-
tion to the city by radio talk host Rush Limbaugh, 
$130,000 realized through the auction of a vintage 
Mercedes that singer Sheryl Crow donated to the 
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Joplin Schools, and a matching gift of $130,000 from 
the people who purchased the donated vehicle.71 
These were the largest individual gifts.  Michelle Ducre 
of the Community Foundation of the Ozarks explained, 
however, that since the tornado, donors had established 
approximately fifteen new funds for various purposes 
and beneficiaries, all to be held and disbursed through 
CFO.72  
One of the first (and, in the view of many informants, 
more important) web-based portals for mustering 
resources for tornado relief and recovery was “Rebuild 
Joplin,” a spinoff from the Joplin Schools’ “Bright 
Futures” program mentioned before.  Building upon 
the clearinghouse component of Bright Futures that 
matches needs and resources, rebuildjoplin.org became 
a major online venue where aid seekers could indicate 
“we need this” and aid providers could indicate “we 
have this available.” 
According to school superintendent C.J. Huff 
and former Board of Education President Ashley 
Micklethwaite, the Bright Futures Advisory Board cre-
ated this portal within 72 hours of the storm.73  Another 
respondent confirmed that “Rebuild Joplin” went live 
online within a week of the tornado.  Although primarily 
a clearinghouse, the Rebuild Joplin website also gave 
people the option of donating cash.  Informants from 
the Joplin Area Chamber of Commerce indicated that 
their organization had helped ensure that the website 
gave special prominence to charities and NGOs well-
known to the Chamber, among the roughly 50 places 
listed where people could make cash donations.
Major Recovery Funding from State of 
Missouri
This support included:
 $2 million for a new pediatric mental health center, 
in anticipation that the community—in particular 
children--would experience long-lived impacts 
of the trauma sustained May 22 and that there 
would be a long-term need for treatment services.  
Governor Nixon announced this funding July 6, 
2011.  The facility, run by Freeman Health System’s 
mental health services affiliate The Ozark Center, 
opened January 2012 as “Will’s Place.”  It was 
named for a young man killed in the storm on the 
way home from the Joplin High School graduation.74
 A $122 million package of state assistance to stimu-
late the construction of new rental and owner-occu-
pied housing.75  The centerpiece of this package was 
the availability of $90 million of low income housing 
tax credits (LIHTC) for new housing development in 
Joplin.  This represented $9 million per year ($4.5 
million of Federal tax credits and $4.5 million of 
Missouri tax credits) for 10 years.  Before NCDP’s 
visit to Joplin, local media covering proposals for 
such subsidized housing developments already had 
reported on the appearance of “not in my backyard” 
type sentiments.
 Kim Cox, the CEO of the Ozark Gateway Association 
of Realtors mentioned that already in early 
December, barely one month after the Citizens 
Advisory Recovery Team had completed its planning 
process and offered recommendations for a long-
term strategy to the Joplin City Council, the facts 
on the ground might compromise the city’s ability 
to take advantage of the low income housing tax 
credits.  Individual homeowner decisions to repair 
or rebuild their damaged or destroyed homes, and 
developer purchases of newly vacant lots already 
had resulted in $100,000 new homes going up 
next to $300,000 new homes, and in some degree 
limited the impact of any new zoning or design 
standards the city ultimately might adopt.  But 
those individual actions also might have comprised 
any developer’s ability to assemble a large enough 
number of adjacent parcels to support subsidized 
apartment developments of any scale.76 
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 Another informant told us that this problem of 
assembling adjacent properties already was so 
severe that several developers, anxious to take 
advantage of the LIHTC, had assembled big parcels 
in areas outside the tornado zone, in more affluent 
neighborhoods where they were encountering stiff 
resistance.77
 $7 million of state business income tax credits 
from the Missouri Department of Economic 
Development, intended to stimulate up to $14 
million of corporate and individual donations to 
the Joplin Area Chamber of Commerce’s “Business 
Recovery Loan Program” and the previously 
mentioned Joplin Tomorrow Foundation.78  These 
two programs provide various kinds of financing to 
businesses directly impacted by the storm, and to 
new businesses that wish to relocate in Joplin.  In 
general, businesses (and individuals with business 
income) may apply fifty percent of such donations 
as credits against their Missouri business income 
tax liability.79
 $50 million of state economic development 
bonding capacity to help Joplin area manufac-
turers and expanded eligibility under two state 
small business assistance programs.
 A commitment from the State of Missouri to 
absorb the full non-federal share of the debris 
removal, releasing the City of Joplin from that 
financial burden.80  
The COAD’s Long-Term Recovery  
Committee
Having previously mounted long term recovery com-
mittees in response to several tornados, floods and ice 
storms, the Jasper County COAD was well-prepared 
to quickly organize a long term recovery committee 
of 50-60 organizations following the 2011 Tornado.81   
Many of the NGOs and churches that were active in 
prior long term recovery committees had remained 
members of COAD, and these organizations jumped 
into the newly-constituted committee.  The churches 
have extensive networks—among themselves, region-
ally in and around Joplin, and nationally through their 
denominations.  Several informants told us that local 
churches were instrumental in recruiting volunteers; 
obtaining donations from their national organizations, 
affiliated religious schools and individual wealthy 
congregation members; housing and feeding volun-
teers; sheltering people displaced by the tornado; and 
providing household goods, food, clothes, furniture, 
big and small appliances, cleaning supplies, clean-up 
crews, building materials and skilled construction 
labor.  All of this assistance was above and beyond 
what people received from government programs.
An Abundance of Volunteers
By early December, Joplin had attracted, received, 
processed, registered, housed and fed 114,000 volun-
teers.  City Manager Mark Rohr told us that he’d heard 
estimates of an additional 42,000-57,000 unregistered 
volunteers who went directly into neighborhoods 
to help out in various ways.  This translates into 2-3 
volunteers for every permanent resident of the city.  
Joplin’s success in mobilizing volunteer support 
would itself be worth an entire study.  Several factors, 
however, appear to have been critical to this successful 
mobilization of volunteer efforts.
One is the previously-discussed ability of Joplin’s 
many churches, spanning a wide variety of Christian 
denominations, to tap into regional and national 
networks.  Although we are not aware of any analysis 
to date of the affiliations of the registered volunteers, 
informant comments and local newspaper coverage 
suggests that a large percentage of the volunteers 
came as a result of a connection to a church, Bible 
College or other Christian organization with a presence 
in Joplin.82  Informants also told us that numerous 
Joplin churches recruited, housed and fed a con-
tinuous influx of volunteers.
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Barely two weeks before the tornado, the local 
American Red Cross chapter had entered into an 
agreement with Missouri Southern State University 
(MSSU), located just northeast of Joplin, to use 
MSSU’s nearly 1000-person capacity dormitory (along 
with associated gymnasiums, the health facility, and 
the cafeteria) as an emergency shelter and volunteer 
management area.  According to Joplin’s emergency 
management director Keith Stammer, the MSSU 
facility provided housing for some portion of the 
volunteers as well as temporary emergency shelter for 
displaced Joplin residents.83 
Another factor was Joplin’s proximity to St. Louis and, 
therefore, to the skills and resources of Americorps St. 
Louis and its experienced emergency response teams.  
The first Americorps team reached Joplin before 
sunrise on May 23.  It immediately began organizing 
the processing of volunteers at the MSSU facility—
registering, giving basic health and safety advice, 
assigning volunteers to projects and transporting 
them safely into Joplin and other impacted communi-
ties.  The City Manager and Director of Emergency 
Management both lauded the well-run and efficient 
system that Americorps quickly established and main-
tained for months on end, particularly the fact that the 
Americorps operation largely prevented volunteers 
from unintentionally impeding or complicating the 
activities of professional responders and municipal 
employees.84 
Keith Stammer was effusive: “We love Americorps.  
Those kids came in and hit the ground like buzz 
saws, plus, several of them have real geek skills that 
would help a lot, particularly in terms of volunteer 
management.”85
A final factor was the region’s ability to mobilize 
resources other than the volunteers themselves, 
through the many organizations that participated 
in the Long Term Recovery Committee, through the 
Ozark Gateway Association of Realtors, the Joplin 
Area Chamber of Commerce and others.  These 
organizations collectively ensured that the volunteers, 
especially those engaged in clearing sites, cleaning 
and demolishing buildings, and repairing damaged 
structures, would not be short of the needed tools and 
materials.
As of our visit, local officials expected this surge of 
both volunteers and material to be a major financial 
benefit to Joplin, to the extent that FEMA ultimately 
would agree to apply the value of donated labor and 
supplies to the city’s required matching share for 
federal assistance under the Stafford Act.  A prelimi-
nary analysis by the city’s finance director in January 
2012 estimated that FEMA would value those amounts 
at nearly $18 million.86
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The Citizens Advisory Recovery Team or “CART” process refers to a planning  
process for long-term recovery that got underway in earnest in late June 2011. 
The team consisted of individuals from a broad cross 
section of the community, including city government, 
the two major hospitals, the chamber of commerce, 
large and small businesses, the public school 
system, a community foundation, the real estate and 
builder community, banks, utilities, public health, a 
university and the Missouri Department of Economic 
Development.87  All CART members were volunteers 
who also had full time jobs.  Participation was in an 
individual capacity, not as representatives of their 
employers or any particular sector or segment of the 
community.  Other than the CEOs of Mercy St. John’s 
Regional Medical Center and Freeman Health System, 
the team did not include individuals whose primary 
focus was the delivery of social, health or human ser-
vices or disaster case management.  Nor did it include 
people employed by churches, community-based 
organizations, federal agencies or advocacy groups.  
Notably, it included few individuals involved with 
the operations of the COAD or Long Term Recovery 
Committee.88  It was a self-selected organization in 
the sense that people who already knew each other 
and had some comfort level with each other came 
together to meet a commonly perceived need.  Several 
informants noted that City Manager Mark Rohr and 
Chamber president Rob O’Brian both played a key role 
in recruiting and organizing the team.89
The CART process also received technical, logistical 
and operational support from FEMA through what 
had been known as “Emergency Support Function 
#14 (ESF #14), Long-Term Community Recovery.”90   
The Emergency Support Functions collectively are 
an element of the National Response Framework, 
the organizational structure and procedures that the 
federal government utilizes to deliver federal aid when 
disasters occur, primarily during the crisis periods 
and short term recovery.91  FEMA professionals from 
Kansas City, Topeka, Phoenix, Seattle, Springfield (MO), 
Denver and Sacramento, led by Steve Castaner, Branch 
Chief for Long-Term Community Recovery in Region 
VII, provided ESF #14 support for this disaster by 
facilitating and supporting the CART process.92
During FEMA’s earliest meetings with the individuals 
who ultimately would comprise CART, the focus was 
on the options available to them—how they could 
organize themselves, the varied objectives they could 
set, the different kinds of processes they could pursue, 
and the range of roles FEMA could play in any such 
process.  According to Steve Castaner, FEMA did not 
push anyone in the direction of the CART process 
that actually occurred, but rather let the structure and 
process emerge organically in accordance with local 
preferences and capacity.  CART “was a result of our 
communication with them on some strategies that 
they could use, using the FEMA ESF #14 ‘self-help 
guide’ and using some recommendations from our 
side as far as how to get set up.  But they ultimately 
made all those final decisions.”93  
Based upon FEMA’s contacts with Joplin leaders 
during the first few weeks after the tornado, the ESF 
#14 team went to Joplin expecting to be dealing with a 
very self-directed group.  According to Castaner, “We 
had an idea going in that they were a high-capacity 
community, that a relatively small number of civic 
leaders had lost a family member or their home, that 
there still was a lot of infrastructure functional in the 
community.  So we knew going in that we probably 
were not going to do a formal recovery plan for them. 
We had a general idea that we were going to play a
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a technical assistance role, a little backroom-type role.  
We weren’t going to be out front” as FEMA had been 
in other ESF #14 engagements.94  Although Castaner 
and other FEMA staff had periodic direct contact 
with the City Manager and president of the chamber 
of commerce, on a day to day basis, they interacted 
primarily with the CART members.
Although there may have been informal CART orga-
nizational activity earlier, our knowledge begins with 
a June 30, 2011 meeting where the CART members 
divided the team into four subgroups or “sectors,” and 
selected a chair and co-chair for each: Housing and 
Neighborhoods, Schools and Community Facilities, 
Infrastructure and Environment, and Economic 
Development.95  From then until the middle of August, 
CART focused on obtaining citizen input.  CART 
encouraged residents of Joplin to put forward any 
and all ideas for things they would like to change 
or improve about their city as it recovered, without 
consideration of practicalities or politics.  A CART pre-
sentation to the City Council summarized the process 
as follows:
“The first citizen input meeting was held during two 
sessions on July 12th at Memorial 9th and 10th Grade 
Center and was attended by approximately 350 resi-
dents.  Large white boards were stationed around the 
room with questions related to each sector.  Residents 
were encouraged to write their ideas and responses on 
sticky notes that were affixed to the boards.  The result 
was a 50 page booklet that contained every piece 
of feedback we received.  Sector groups studied the 
responses to determine prevailing themes.  The second 
input meeting at College Heights Christian School on 
August 17th allowed residents to ‘vote’ on priorities 
with dots posted underneath each theme.  Officials 
from HUD, the EPA and the AIA (American Institute of 
Architects) spoke to residents to suggest how sustain-
able methods could be applied across all sectors as 
well as possible assistance that could be received from 
government programs.”96
Between the first and second citizen input sessions, 
CART selected a chair and co-chair.  Chair Jane 
Cage pithily described the level of expertise and 
commitment in the CART:  “I have the City Manager, 
the Superintendent of Schools, the president of the 
Chamber, and the president of the utility company.  It’s 
a bunch of ‘type A’s’ who like to look at the big picture 
but not really the details.  So it’s a big group to say 
grace over.”
CART sought input other ways besides large citizen 
meetings.  It hosted a booth at the 2011 Boom Town 
Days festival and at three of the downtown “Third 
Thursday” events.97  Members canvassed students at 
the MSSU campus and attended a summer evening 
event at the FEMA temporary housing site near the 
airport.  CART received approximately 1500 responses 
from its varied fact finding activities.98  Beyond the 
public input-oriented activities, CART—with help 
from FEMA ESF-14—held two workshops for CART 
members and other citizens who participated in the 
four sectors even though not formally members of 
the team.  These workshops focused on design, archi-
tectural and planning issues, and the use of decision 
making tools to help prioritize projects.
At the end of the citizen input phase of the process, 
CART members perceived pressure to get the 
remaining process over with quickly.99  They felt this 
pressure from people and businesses with real estate 
decisions that they had put on hold pending the CART 
recommendations, and from the Mayor, who wanted 
the Council to be able to take some specific actions 
and demonstrate to the electorate that it was on the 
case.  Jane Cage constituted an executive committee 
including herself and the CART co-chair, the chairs of 
the four sectors, plus Troy Bolander (the city’s planner),
at the CrOssrOaDs Of LONg-term reCOVery: jOPLIN, mIssOurI sIx mONths after the may 22, 2011 tOrNaDO 32
the CItIZeNs aDVIsOry   reCOVery team (Cart) PrOCess
cont’d
Steve Castaner (FEMA), and Sallie Hemenway from 
the state Department of Economic Development.  This 
executive committee distilled the diffuse citizen input 
into an overarching vision statement and a set of 
goals for each sector.  After reviewing the results with 
the entire CART, the executive committee finalized a 
report for the City Council.  CART formally presented 
its report, “Listening to Joplin,” to the City Council on 
November 7.  The Council made a symbolic/ceremonial 
gesture of “accepting” the report without endorsing 
it.100  Table 2 shows the top recommendations for each 
sector.
At this point, CART members were concerned about 
how to sustain momentum beyond the presentation to 
the Council.  They were keenly aware that their report 
included recommendations that were completely 
outside the legal purview of the City government; 
some were the sole or primary responsibility of the 
school district or the chamber of commerce.  Jane 
Cage strongly credited then Mayor Michael Woolston 
with proposing the solution.
CART SECTOR TOP FIVE PRIORITY PROJECTS
Housing and Neighborhoods
1. Establish Pilot Neighborhood – Includes green space, walking ability,  
underground utilities, connectivity, and sense of community. 
2. Establish Pilot Neighborhood Houses – Include energy efficient housing,  
recommended building techniques, and sustainable sizing and proximity. 
3. Create a Neighborhood Architectural Advisory Board – Composed of city leaders, 
architects, builders, and community leaders; Provides expertise on best practices, 
would allow fast track of ideas and review of resources. 
4. Stricter enforcement of existing nuisance codes. Provide public awareness  
campaign. Review nuisance and zoning codes for possible improvements. 
5. Distribute city-wide educational materials regarding insurance information  
to the citizens, both renters and homeowners. 
Schools and Community 
Facilities
1. House Franklin Technical Center and new Joplin High School in one building.
2. Build storm shelters within new schools. 
3. Provide a method for 9th graders to better assimilate into high school.
4. Build a memorial to commemorate tornado and its victims.
5. Develop a Center for Arts and Entertainment.
TABLE 2. MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS FROM “LISTENING TO JOPLIN,” NOVEMBER 7, 2011
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CART SECTOR TOP FIVE PRIORITY PROJECTS
Infrastructure and 
Environment
1. Require bike lanes for all new street construction where streets are functioning as a 
collector level or greater.
2.  Install sidewalks on both sides of street in devastation zone and new  
developments of all types (residential, commercial, industrial). 
3. Create a Joplin Creek Trail System that links into parks/green areas of all types,  
especially in conjunction with flood plain areas. Focus upon development of a  
significant trail system within our community to foster walking, jogging, running,  
and biking by our residents.
4. Create water retention and bio swale areas in public parks (where appropriate) to 
capture and slow storm water runoff. Add rain gardens with planting of native  
species and appropriate tree plantings.
5. Establish city-wide curbside recycling and more recycling receptacles at public  
facilities and events. 
Economic Development
1. Establish four key corridors (these were identified) for near-term and long-term  
commercial, multi-family and mixed use development.
2. Develop and enforce guidelines to raise the appearance, materials and  
landscaping of commercial construction city-wide. 
3. Pursue and support the development of a medical school, possibly in  
partnership with Missouri Southern State University or other host.
4. Develop a Virtual Spec Building.
5. Establish and develop workforce housing projects to re-establish and maintain  
a quality workforce.
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After the presentation, the Mayor charged an 
“Implementation Task Force” with setting priorities 
among the wish list in the report, and figuring out 
how to implement them. This task force consisted of 
the CART Executive Committee and representatives of 
three major constituencies: 
 The Superintendent of Schools and 2 Board of 
Education members, 
 The chair and President of the Chamber, and
 The City Manager and 2 members of the Council.   
Although this had not been settled for certain as of 
NCDP’s visit, members of this Implementation Task 
Force were contemplating a single presentation to a 
joint meeting of the full City Council, the full Board of 
Education and the full Chamber Board. 
the CItIZeNs aDVIsOry   reCOVery team (Cart) PrOCess
cont’d
As shown in Table 2, the recommendations in “Listening 
to Joplin” leaned heavily towards elements of the 
physical environment that would be susceptible to 
change and improvement as part of the reconstruction 
process.  These included the location and nature of 
commercial and mixed use districts; residential building, 
design and energy efficiency standards; sidewalks and 
bike paths; new schools and school tornado shelters; 
a trail system; and a memorial.  But there also were 
undeniable, if more subtle acknowledgements of other 
types of concerns that the community hoped to be able 
to address.  
The priority for a formal high school orientation program 
for Joplin’s young teenagers to facilitate the transition 
from middle school reflected long-standing community 
concerns about the quality of public education and 
high school graduation rates (the same concerns that 
motivated and energized the Bright Futures program).  
The priority for insurance education stemmed from an 
awareness of how many homeowners and renters who 
experienced storm losses were either totally uninsured 
or greatly underinsured.  The strong public desire for 
walking trails and bike lanes reflected a desire to create 
more opportunities for exercise and healthy life patterns 
as well as a desire to make nature more accessible.
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Figure 8
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In Joplin’s case, this was reflected in the Council-
Manager form of municipal government and the 
method of electing Council members both from 
specific zones and at large; the fairly homogeneous 
Christian religious makeup of the community; Joplin’s 
status as the economic hub of a multi-state region; 
the recent history with localized tornados and ice 
storms that resulted in an experienced COAD and prior 
successful long term recovery committees; a long-
established chamber of commerce with strong regional 
connections and experience in running economic 
development programs; a public school system that 
recently had been engaged in a strategic planning 
process and a major construction program; a large and 
diverse faith-based community that had established 
collaborative relationships across its members and 
with the schools and municipal government; and the 
existence of two major not-for-profit health systems.
Beyond these fundamental elements, Joplin appears 
to have a highly competent administrative structure 
and processes in its day to day, normal operations.  
FEMA’s ESF#14 staff, as mentioned previously, quickly 
sized up Joplin as a “high-capacity” community which 
had been “very successful.”101   FEMA presumably was 
aware of the city government-led efforts to revitalize 
the downtown; of the success of the Bright Futures col-
laboration among the public schools, faith-based com-
munity and chamber of commerce; of the fact that the 
Joplin Area Chamber of Commerce was a productive 
economic development agent for the city and region, 
as well as a long-time  recipient of 5-star accreditation 
from the United States Chamber of Commerce; of 
the nearly 50-year presence of the Economic Security 
Corporation of Southwest Area and its success in 
attracting millions of federal housing and social ser-
vices dollars into Joplin; of the track record of churches 
and social service agencies mobilizing resources to 
assist victims of prior smaller scale emergencies; and 
of the sheltering arrangement that had been estab-
lished among Missouri Southern State University, the 
Greater Ozarks Regional Chapter of the American Red 
Cross and the City of Joplin as prudent preparation for 
a catastrophe nobody knew was coming. 
Evidence of Joplin’s strong pre-disaster capacity to 
handle its affairs is found in the second round of 
siren warnings before the tornado crossed the city, 
in the rapidity with which the city manager got up 
in a helicopter to assess the damage through night 
vision goggles and in how quickly the city’s public 
works department cleared the streets.  It is found in 
the haste with which School Superintendent C.J. Huff 
obtained an assessment of how many school buildings 
he had left and his confidence that the school system 
staff could replace the lost space in less than three 
months. It can be seen in the immediate and sustained 
efforts mounted by the Ozark Gateway Association of 
Realtors and the JACC to establish communications 
with, and assist their membership.  It is found in how 
effectively city officials managed the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers and the contractors who removed the 
debris. It existed in the guise of the “Area D Multi-
Agency Coordination Center” that enabled Joplin’s
Joplin’s recovery trajectory appeared related to a complex constellation of con-
textual factors, including the political and social environment, the dynamics of 
the local and regional economy, the competence and effectiveness of local gov-
ernance (not just in the public sector but in all sectors), cultural norms regarding 
cooperation and competition, and prior experience with major disruptive events. 
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emergency management team to quickly mobilize sup-
port from other local and state emergency response 
departments.  Perhaps most of all, it’s found in the 
incredible inventiveness and improvisation of the 
staffs at St. John’s Regional Medical Center, Freeman 
Hospital West, the major EMS providers and the rest of 
the local medical and health care system in responding 
to a disaster that was beyond all mandated parameters 
for planning, drilling and exercising.
Like most other communities in the United States, 
Joplin had not invested in a diverse tool-kit specifically 
with recovery from a natural disaster in mind.  Once 
the tornado had occurred, however, various members 
of the community rapidly activated tools and mecha-
nisms for recovery, including the Citizens Advisory 
Recovery Team process, the FEMA ESF #14 technical 
and logistical support, the housing study commis-
sioned by the City Manager, the Joplin Business 
Recovery and Expansion Initiative spearheaded by the 
JACC, and the request for information from potential 
master developers.  They also promptly created 
conduits for the collection of external recovery assis-
tance dollars including (among others) the Long Term 
Recovery Committee’s assistance fund, the Community 
Foundation of the Ozark’s Joplin Recovery Fund and 
First Response Fund, the JACC’s Business Recovery 
Fund, and the Joplin Tomorrow Foundation.  The State’s 
special allocations of low income housing tax credits 
and state business income tax credits also fall in 
this category, as they were intended to direct private 
sources of capital towards Joplin’s recovery rather 
than elsewhere. The network of faith based organiza-
tions and their ongoing mission activities were latent 
recovery capacities that the churches dramatically 
scaled up following the disaster.
Some academic theories of recovery assert that fol-
lowing a disaster, the achievement of the results that 
people care about most depends upon achievement of 
outcomes that don’t factor directly (or perhaps even 
consciously) into the way individuals, families and 
households think about their well-being.  For example, 
in order ultimately to get new housing and jobs, to 
repair infrastructure, and to create an environment that 
citizens accept and remain bonded to, there must be 
continuity of the public sector.  In the context of Joplin, 
an impaired or incapacitated local government could 
not have managed the debris removal, participated 
in a CART process, worked with state and federal 
government to get tax credits and grants, or evaluated 
competing proposals from developers. 
There also must be an environment that supports 
households and businesses in making their indepen-
dent decisions to remain, rebuild and reinvest.  This 
does not necessarily mean that government must 
subsidize or attempt to steer such individual decisions 
in a particular direction.  At a minimum, though, 
government must try to minimize the obstacles that 
complicate or frustrate individual and group initiative.  
It appears that the City of Joplin supported its citizens’ 
and businesses’ desires to rebuild first and foremost 
by removing the rubble in record time and promptly 
lifting the construction moratorium area by area as 
it became clear that construction would no longer 
interfere with debris removal.  The leaders of the public 
schools and of the Mercy and Freeman health systems, 
through their early and dramatic decisions, did every-
thing in their power to instill a degree of confidence 
that recovery would occur rapidly and to encourage 
fence-sitters to reinvest in homes and businesses in 
Joplin. The diverse community actors who contributed 
to the CART process, realizing that some residents, 
business owners and outside investors were deferring 
decisions until CART finished its work, completed their 
exercise in barely four months (July through October) 
under very difficult conditions.
Many disaster researchers argue that a community that
joplin’s recovery in six months  aN OVerVIeW 
cont’d
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actually articulates where it hopes a recovery process will 
lead and the kinds of ultimate recovery outcomes it hopes 
to attain will be more likely to engage in coordinated and 
integrated activities towards those ends after a disaster, 
than a community that isn’t explicit about its goals.  
Furthermore, a community that has a strong foundation—
a resilient economic base, an amenable political culture, 
competent and effective organizations and leaders, and 
a tradition of cooperation and collaboration across sec-
tors—as well as the tools and capacities to keep all sectors 
operating post-disaster and to gather community input 
and build consensus, will be more likely to articulate its 
recovery objectives.   
In Joplin, the CART process distilled more than 1500 
pieces of citizen input into a precise, concrete, and—most 
participants believe—achievable set of objectives for local 
government, the school system, the public health system, 
the business community, the local non-profit network 
and faith-based organizations.  Although Joplin’s long-
term recovery from a disaster that displaced close to one 
third of its population was just beginning as of NCDP’s 
interviews, these CART recommendations subsequently 
influenced specific public and private decisions about the 
selection of a “master developer,” zoning and land use 
changes, allocation of low income housing tax credits, and 
the disbursement of grants from some of the philanthropic 
funds established by donors after the tornado. 
cont’d
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spirit tree, joplin (Christopher mardorf/fema)
Figure 9
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